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SOMETHING MORE: OFFICIAL ACTION AFTER
McDONNELL v. UNITED STATES
Matthew T. Ciulla*
INTRODUCTION
Public corruption cases often feature “tawdry tales” of government
officials receiving lavish gifts, over-the-top luxury vacations, and even
cash in exchange for conveying a perceived official benefit to the gift-
giver.1  One such case, McDonnell v. United States, featured scintillat-
ing tales of a governor receiving Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball gowns
while hosting extravagant parties for his benefactors.2
No matter how dazzling the facts, however, the technical aspects of
these cases also showcase issues with our federal criminal justice sys-
tem.  Resolving these issues is important, as a wide array of public
corruption statutes are available to federal prosecutors, but these stat-
utes have been narrowed by the judiciary on numerous grounds.3
McDonnell highlighted one such issue: the ill-defined “official act”
requirement in the federal bribery statute.4  In the case, the Supreme
Court ultimately held that a public official arranging a meeting in ex-
change for a thing of value, “without more,” does not constitute an
official act for bribery purposes.5  This holding alarmed some com-
mentators, who focused on the tawdry nature of the case.6  For exam-
ple, one commentator wrote that “the Court set a new standard for
* Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2017; Bachelor of Science, Vanderbilt University,
2014.  The author thanks professor Stephen F. Smith for his insight on this Article and all things
criminal law, and the DePaul Law Review staff for their edits and hard work.
1. See, e.g., McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2016) (“But our concern is not
with tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball gowns.”); Andrew Lopez, Ex-Moreno Valley
Councilman to Plead Guilty in $2.3M Bribery Case, NBC4 LOS ANGELES (Nov. 5, 2013, 1:03
PM), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Moreno-Valley-Corruption-Bribery-Councilman-
IRS—230703501.html (councilman accepting $2.3 million bribe).
2. See, e.g., Amy Davidson Sorkin, The Supreme Court’s Bribery-Blessing McDonnell Deci-
sion, NEW YORKER, Jun. 27, 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/the-supreme-
courts-bribery-blessing-mcdonnell-decision; see also McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375.
3. See generally John S. Gawey, Note, The Hobbs Leviathan: The Dangerous Breadth of the
Hobbs Act and Other Corruption Statutes, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 383, 417–18 (2011).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2006) (defining “official act”); see generally McDonnell, 136 S.
Ct. at 2367–71.
5. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371–72.
6. See, e.g., Sorkin, supra note 2; see also McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375. R
705
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official-bribery cases that is so absurdly narrow that it will likely be
almost impossible to convict any but the most bumbling politicians.”7
Is this commentator right?  Has the Supreme Court rendered fed-
eral prosecutors helpless against public corruption?  Can the rich now
indiscriminately “purchase office-holders” without fear?8
In a word, no.  The Supreme Court did not “legalize corruption.”9
Rather, the Court consciously—and unanimously—sought to limit
how far the definition of “official act” extended in the public corrup-
tion statutes.10  The Court asserted that it left “ample room for prose-
cuting corruption,” and indeed it did.11
This Article first looks at two pre-McDonnell interpretations of the
phrase “official act” in the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201.
These two cases, Sun-Diamond and Valdes, limited the government’s
broad interpretations of the phrase.  Next, this Article details the fac-
tual background of McDonnell, followed by an analysis of the Su-
preme Court’s decision.  The Article then lays out three post-
McDonnell example cases.  Finally, this Article synthesizes the case
law and concludes that McDonnell’s main impact on public corruption
prosecutions will be seen in new jury instructions and in prosecutors’
searching for “something more” in their case theories.
II. THE DEFINITION OF “OFFICIAL ACT” PRE-MCDONNELL
Many public corruption prosecutions involve proving that a public
official performed an “official act,” and courts often turn to the offi-
cial act definition in the bribery statute, § 201(a)(3).12  This statute de-
fines bribery as:
[When a] public official or person selected to be a public official,
directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or
agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any
7. Sorkin, supra note 2. R
8. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Supreme Court Gets Ready to Legalize Corruption, NEW YORKER,
May 4, 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-supreme-court-gets-ready-to-
legalize-corruption; see also Sorkin, supra note 2 (quoting same). R
9. See Toobin, supra note 8 (asserting that the Supreme Court “legalize[d] corruption”). R
10. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375 (“[Our concern is] with the broader legal implications of the
Government’s boundless interpretation of the federal bribery statute.”).
11. Id.
12. For example, in Governor McDonnell’s case, both honest services fraud, see 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1343, 1346 (2006), and Hobbs Act extortion, see 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006), required showing
that he had accepted bribes. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365 (honest services fraud “forbid[s]
‘fraudulent schemes to deprive another of honest services through bribes or kickbacks’” and
Hobbs Act extortion “include[s] ‘taking a bribe’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Skilling v.
United States, 561 U.S. 358, 404 (2010), and then quoting Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255,
260, 268–69 (1992))).
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other person or entity, in return for . . . being influenced in the per-
formance of any official act.13
The statute, in turn, defines “official act” as “any decision or action on
any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which
may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before
any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such offi-
cial’s place of trust or profit.”14
Before McDonnell, the Supreme Court and lower courts decided
several cases interpreting this definition of official act.  This Section
details two such cases: Sun-Diamond and Valdes.
A. Sun-Diamond: Thing of Value Given Must Be Linked to a
Specific Official Act—Not Just General Goodwill
In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, the Su-
preme Court considered the question of whether “conviction under
the illegal gratuity statute requires any showing beyond the fact that a
gratuity was given because of the recipient’s official position.”15  Sun-
Diamond was a “trade association that engaged in marketing and lob-
bying activities on behalf of its member cooperatives,” who were
growers of raisins, figs, walnuts, prunes, and hazelnuts.16  The United
States alleged Sun-Diamond gave Secretary of Agriculture Michael
Epsy illegal gifts in violation of the federal gratuities statute.17  The
trade organization allegedly gave Epsy “approximately $5,900 in ille-
gal gratuities: tickets to the 1993 U.S. Open Tennis Tournament
(worth $2,295), luggage ($2,427), meals ($665), and a framed print and
crystal bowl ($524).”18
However, the gratuities statute does not simply prohibit giving gifts
to public officials.  Instead, the accused must have given or have
promised to give “anything of value” to a “public official, former pub-
lic official, or person selected to be a public official for or because of
any official act performed or to be performed by such [person].”19
The United States alleged that Sun-Diamond gave the gifts “for or
because of” two matters before Secretary Epsy:
First, [Sun-Diamond’s members] participated in the Market Promo-
tion Plan (MPP), a grant program administered by the Department
of Agriculture to promote the sale of U.S. farm commodities in for-
13. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A) (2006).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2006).
15. 526 U.S. 398, 400 (1999).
16. Id. at 400–01.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 401.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added); Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 401.
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eign countries. . . . If their plans were approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture, the trade organizations received funds to be used in
defraying the foreign marketing expenses of their constituents. [Be-
cause] [e]ach of [Sun-Diamond’s] member cooperatives was the
largest member of its respective trade organization . . . , [it] was
understandably concerned, then, when Congress in 1993 instructed
the Secretary to promulgate regulations giving small-sized entities
preference in obtaining MPP funds. . . . If the Secretary did not
deem respondent’s member cooperatives to be small-sized entities,
there was a good chance they would no longer receive MPP
grants. . . .
Second, respondent had an interest in the Federal Government’s
regulation of methyl bromide, a low-cost pesticide used by many
individual growers in respondent’s member cooperatives.  In 1992,
the Environmental Protection Agency announced plans to promul-
gate a rule to phase out the use of methyl bromide in the United
States.  The indictment alleged that respondent sought the Depart-
ment of Agriculture’s assistance in persuading the EPA to abandon
its proposed rule altogether, or at least to mitigate its impact.20
Importantly, the United States “did not allege a specific connection
between” either of these two matters, or any other matter before the
Secretary, and the gratuities that Sun-Diamond gave to the Secre-
tary.21  Thus, the question before the Court was “whether conviction
under the illegal gratuity statute requires any showing beyond the fact
that a gratuity was given because of the recipient’s official position.”22
The district court in Sun-Diamond held that gifts given to a public
official “simply because he held public office” were illegal gratuities,
and that the “government need not prove that the alleged gratuity was
linked to a specific or identifiable official act or any act at all.”23  This
holding would have criminalized “token gifts to the President based
on his official position and not linked to any identifiable act—such as
the replica jerseys given by championship sports teams each year dur-
ing ceremonial White House visits,” “a high school principal’s gift of a
school baseball cap to the Secretary of Education,” and “providing a
complimentary lunch for the Secretary of Agriculture in conjunction
with his speech to the farmers concerning various matters of USDA
policy.”24  In short, it would have criminalized essentially any gift—
token or not—to a federal government official.
20. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 401–02.
21. Id. at 402 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 400.
23. Id. at 403 (quoting United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 941 F. Supp. 1262,
1268 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
24. Id. at 406–07.
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Recognizing this “peculiar resul[t],” and noting that Congress surely
had a reason for including the “official act” requirement in the statute,
the Supreme Court rejected this broad interpretation.  The Court held
that in order to prove a violation of the gratuities statute, “the Gov-
ernment must prove a link between a thing of value conferred upon a
public official and a specific ‘official act’ for or because of which it was
given.”25  In essence, the Court found that merely giving gifts to a
public official to “build a reservoir of goodwill that might ultimately
affect one or more of a multitude of unspecified acts” would not sup-
port a gratuities conviction.26
Sun-Diamond stands for the proposition that prosecutors must
show a specific link between the thing of value given and an official
act to be performed.  It is not enough for the prosecution to allege
that the gift given was merely trying to build up goodwill with the
official, or else all token gifts could be criminalized—an absurd result.
Courts applying the public corruption statutes frequently cite Sun-Di-
amond’s analysis in deciding matters of first impression.
B. Valdes: “Official Act” Must Include an Actual Decision or
Action, or a Promise to Actually Decide or Act
After Sun-Diamond, the D.C. Circuit decided Valdes, a case that
read the “official act” definition narrowly.27  Nelson Valdes was a
detective in the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department with access to
police databases.28  An undercover FBI informant named William
Blake, posing as a judge, met Valdes at a nightclub.29  At the club,
Valdes “gave Blake his business card with his cell phone number, ‘just
in case [Blake] ever needed a favor.’”30  Thereafter, the FBI “in-
structed Blake to see if Valdes would provide him with police informa-
tion,” and then “entered the names of five fictitious individuals, along
with fictitious addresses and license plate numbers, into state com-
puter databases.”31
Blake then asked Valdes to “look up some license plate numbers,
ostensibly to get contact information on individuals who owed him
money.”32  He repeated this several times and gave Valdes various
25. Id. at 407, 414.
26. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 405, 413.
27. Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1324, 1324–25 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
28. Id. at 1320.
29. Id. at 1321.
30. Id. (alteration in original).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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cash payments ranging from $50 to $200.33  In exchange, Valdes
searched the names in the state police database and also ran a war-
rants check at Blake’s request.34  Valdes was eventually indicted on
three counts of bribery.35
A jury found Valdes guilty of “three counts of the lesser-included
offense of receipt of an illegal gratuity.”36  On appeal, the panel deci-
sion focused on the statutory definition of “official act:”
The government’s concept of “official act” is striking in its complete
failure to address the statutory clause modifying “decision or ac-
tion,” namely, “on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or
controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by
law be brought before any public official.”  The words are far from
self-defining, but they suggest at least a rudimentary degree of for-
mality, such as would be associated with a decision or action directly
related to an adjudication, a license issuance (or withdrawal or mod-
ification), an investigation, a procurement, or a policy adoption.37
Relying on the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Sun-Diamond, the
panel found that Detective Valdes’s computer searches did not fall
into the category of “official acts.”38  Rather, the panel found,
criminalizing the searches would bring the statute into the realm of
“absurdity” noted by the Court in Sun-Diamond.39  The panel wrote:
Valdes’s [computer] queries would appear to fit within the range of
activities excluded from coverage by Sun-Diamond’s examples.  All
the officials’ acts (the [computer] queries, ceremony, visit, or
speech) have in common that none is a “decision or action” that
directly affects any formal government decision made in fulfillment
of government’s public responsibilities. . . . While one or more of
Valdes’s disclosures may have been unethical, sanctionable, or even
criminal independently of § 201, and while disclosure of an out-
standing arrest warrant might have an indirect effect on its execu-
tion, none of these disclosures constituted a “decision or action on
any question, matter [etc.]” in the usual sense of those words.40
Thus, the panel rejected the government’s broad reading of “official
act” and required that the government show the defendant took or
promised to take an “action” or “decision” on a pending “question,
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy.”41
33. Valdes, 475 F.3d at 1321–22.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1322.
36. Id.
37. United States v. Valdes, 437 F.3d 1276, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2006), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 475
F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
38. Id. at 1280.
39. Id.; see also Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 406–08.
40. Valdes, 437 F.3d at 1280 (fourth alteration in original).
41. Id. at 1280–81; see also 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2006).
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On rehearing en banc, the D.C. Circuit rejected the government’s
wide-ranging view of “official act.”42  Again citing Sun-Diamond, the
en banc court noted that “Sun-Diamond’s interpretive gloss, like the
rule of lenity . . . works to protect a citizen from punishment under a
statute that gives at best dubious notice that it has criminalized his
conduct.”43  The court also noted that a narrow definition of “official
act” was appropriate, as there are other anti-corruption statutes that
criminalize the behavior at issue in Valdes.
[B]oth our precedent and the language of the statute make clear
that § 201 is not about officials’ moonlighting, or their misuse of
government resources, or the two in combination. . . .  [N]umerous
other regulations and statutes prohibit these activities. . . .  And
though the likelihood that Valdes violated these other statutes im-
plies nothing direct about his culpability under § 201, their existence
underscores an observation in Sun-Diamond: “Absent a text that
clearly requires it, we ought not expand this one piece of the regula-
tory puzzle so dramatically as to make many other pieces misfits. . . .
Not only does the text here not require that result; its more natural
reading forbids it.44
The Valdes en banc court held that the government must show “inap-
propriate influence on decisions that the government actually
makes.”45  Accordingly, official actions are properly characterized as
answering questions such as “Should this person receive a contract or
disability benefit, and for how much?,” “Should this person be prose-
cuted?,” or “What firm should supply submarines for the Navy?,” but
not questions such as “‘Where do you live?’ and ‘What kind of car do
you drive?’”46
Thus, Valdes, when read in conjunction with Sun-Diamond, stands
for the proposition that there must be (1) either an actual decision or
action, or a promise to actually decide or act, on “any question, mat-
ter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” before the public official
and (2) a link between the action and the thing of value given to the
public official.47
42. Valdes, 475 F.3d at 1322–23.
43. Id. at 1323.
44. Id. at 1324–25 (quoting United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 412
(1999)) (fifth and sixth alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
45. Id. at 1325.
46. Id. at 1323–25.
47. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 406, 414; Valdes, 475 F.3d at 1324–25; 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)
(2006).
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III. THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES MCDONNELL
With the backdrop of cases such as Sun-Diamond and Valdes, the
Supreme Court decided McDonnell in June 2016.  This Section first
details the factual background of the case, and then provides an over-
view of the Supreme Court’s opinion.
A. Factual Background
On January 21, 2014, the United States filed an indictment in the
Eastern District of Virginia against former Virginia Governor Robert
McDonnell and his wife, Maureen McDonnell.48  The indictment
charged McDonnell with “one count of conspiracy to commit honest
services fraud, three counts of honest services fraud, one count of con-
spiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion, six counts of Hobbs Act ex-
tortion, and two counts of making a false statement.”49
While governor, McDonnell had become entangled with the CEO
of Star Scientific, Inc., a “technology-oriented company with a mission
to promote maintenance of a healthy metabolism and lifestyle.”50  The
essential mission of the company was to “utilize[e] certain alkaloids in
the tobacco plant, namely anatabine,” to create a smoking cessation
product, as well as an anti-inflammatory product that would be used
to help manage side effects from disorders “such as thyroiditis, diabe-
tes, arthritis, Alzheimer’s disease, and multiple sclerosis.”51
Wishing to “overcome the difficulties in gaining consumer accept-
ance for its products,” Star Scientific’s CEO, Jonnie Williams, sought
to “encourag[e] scientific studies of anatabine,” and then “present the
results of those studies to physicians in the hope that the physicians
would recommend Star Scientific’s dietary supplements to their pa-
tients.”52  Williams hoped Virginia’s public universities would perform
research studies on anatabine and wanted Governor McDonnell’s as-
sistance in accomplishing this.53
Allegedly in order to obtain said assistance, Williams began offering
the McDonnells various gifts and loans, including a $19,000 luxury
shopping trip in New York City,54 a $50,000 loan,55 a $15,000 gift to
48. Indictment at 1–2, United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No.
14CR00012), aff’d, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
49. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365; see also Indictment, supra note 48, at 1. R
50. Indictment, supra note 48, at 2–4. R
51. Id. at 3.
52. Id. at 4; see also McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361.
53. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361.
54. Indictment, supra note 48, at 8. R
55. Id. at 8–9.
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finance their daughter’s wedding,56 luxury golf outings,57 a private va-
cation at Williams’ multimillion-dollar vacation home including the
use of a Ferrari and a boat,58 an engraved Rolex watch,59 an additional
$70,000 in loans,60 and a Cape Cod luxury vacation.61  The total value
of these gifts and loans was approximately $175,000.62
The government alleged that Williams gave these gifts and loans to
the McDonnells in exchange for Governor McDonnell taking official
action.63  The government alleged that these official actions included:
i. arranging meetings for [Williams] with Virginia government
officials, who were subordinates of the Governor to discuss
and promote [anatabine];
ii. hosting, and the [McDonnells] attending, events at the Gover-
nor’s Mansion designed to encourage Virginia university re-
searchers to initiate studies of anatabine and to promote Star
Scientific’s products to doctors for referral to their patients;
iii. contacting other government officials in the [Governor’s Of-
fice] as part of an effort to encourage Virginia state research
universities to initiate studies of anatabine;
iv. promoting Star Scientific’s products and facilitating its rela-
tionships with Virginia government officials by allowing [Wil-
liams] to invite individuals important to Star Scientific’s
business to exclusive events at the Governor’s Mansion; and
v. recommending that senior government officials in the [Gover-
nor’s Office] meet with Star Scientific executives to discuss
ways that the company’s products could lower healthcare
costs.64
Importantly, Governor McDonnell never took any overt action to fur-
ther the research studies, beyond “arranging a meeting, contacting an-
other public official, or hosting an event.”65
In order to prove the bribery charges, the government was “re-
quired to prove that Governor McDonnell committed or agreed to
commit an ‘official act’ in exchange for the loans and gifts from Wil-
liams.”66  Both parties agreed that the relevant definition was the “of-
ficial act” definition in the federal bribery statute.67  Thus,
56. Id. at 9.
57. Id. at 11.
58. Id. at 14.
59. Id. at 15.
60. Indictment, supra note 48, at 26–27. R
61. Id. at 27.
62. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2364.
63. Indictment, supra note 48, at 34–35. R
64. Id.
65. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2366–67.
66. Id. at 2365.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2012); McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-4\DPL404.txt unknown Seq: 10 26-APR-18 8:20
714 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:705
McDonnell’s conviction for the bribery-related charges wholly de-
pended on the finding that an “official act” included “arranging a
meeting, contacting another public official, or hosting an event—with-
out more.”68
First, quoting the statutory definition of “official act,” the district
judge elaborated on the definition in his jury instruction at the request
of the government.69  He instructed the jury:
Official action as I just defined it includes those actions that have
been clearly established by settled practice as part of a public offi-
cial’s position, even if the action was not taken pursuant to responsi-
bilities explicitly assigned by law.  In other words, official actions
may include acts that a public official customarily performs, even if
those actions are not described in any law, rule, or job descrip-
tion. . . .  In addition, official action can include actions taken in
furtherance of longer-term goals, and an official action is no less
official because it is one in a series of steps to exercise influence or
achieve an end.70
The district court did not, however, give the jury Governor McDon-
nell’s proposed instruction, which would have noted:
[T]he fact that an activity is a routine activity, or a “settled prac-
tice,” of an office-holder does not alone make it an “official act.”
Many settled practices of government officials are not official acts
within the meaning of the statute.  For example, merely arranging a
meeting, attending an event, hosting a reception, or making a
speech are not, standing alone, “official acts,” even if they are set-
tled practices of the official.  A government official’s decisions on
who[m] to invite to lunch, whether to attend an event, or whether to
attend a meeting or respond to a phone call are not decisions on
matters pending before the government. That is because mere in-
gratiation and access are not corruption.71
The jury found Governor McDonnell guilty on the honest services
fraud charges and the Hobbs Act extortion charges, and found him
not guilty on the false statement charges.72
In moving for a new trial, Governor McDonnell focused his argu-
ment on the district court’s rejection of his more narrowly-defined
68. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2367–68.
69. Id. at 2366.
70. Transcript of Proceedings on September 2, 2014 at 31–32, United States v. McDonnell, 64
F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 3:14-CR-12), ECF No. 487, aff’d, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir.
2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016); see also McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2366.
71. United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 512–13 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2355
(2016) (alterations in original) (quoting Robert F. McDonnell’s Proposed Jury Instructions at 79,
United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 3:14-CR-12), ECF No.
287).
72. Jury Verdict Form, United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No.
3:14-CR-12), ECF No. 495, aff’d, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-4\DPL404.txt unknown Seq: 11 26-APR-18 8:20
2018] AFTER McDONNELL v. UNITED STATES 715
jury instructions.73  McDonnell attacked the court’s instructions as
based on “an erroneous understanding of ‘official act.’”  He claimed
the government’s argument that “anything Mr. McDonnell did in his
official capacity as Governor involving Virginia business development
was an official act” was “contrary not only to the statutory definition
of ‘official act,’ but to all of the relevant precedents as well.”74  Thus,
under the government’s position, “merely arranging a meeting, email-
ing a subordinate, and hosting an event—without anything more—
were official acts, provided that they have some relation to a ‘matter,’
however broadly defined.”75
The district court’s denial of McDonnell’s motion for a new trial76
set the stage for appellate review of whether the district court erred in
using the government’s broad meaning of “official act” when in-
structing the jury.
B. The Supreme Court’s McDonnell Opinion
The Supreme Court in McDonnell began with the text of the stat-
ute, which defines “official act” as “any decision or action on any
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at
any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any pub-
lic official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place
of trust or profit.”77  The Court parsed this definition into two distinct
requirements: First, the Government must identify a “‘question, mat-
ter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’ that ‘may at any time be
pending’ or ‘may by law be brought’ before a public official,” and sec-
ond, “the Government must prove that the public official made a deci-
sion or took an action ‘on’ that question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding, or controversy, or agreed to do so.”78  The Court then
divided the issue presented into two alternative questions: First,
“whether arranging a meeting, contacting another official, or hosting
an event—without more—can be a ‘question, matter, cause, suit, pro-
ceeding or controversy,’” and, second, “if not, whether it can be a
73. Memorandum in Support of Defendant Robert F. McDonnell’s Motion # 40 – Motion for
New Trial Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure at 3, United States v.
McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 3:14-CR-12), ECF No. 518, aff’d, 792 F.3d
478 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) [hereinafter Motion for New Trial].
74. Id. at 2–3.
75. Id.
76. Order Denying ECF 511 Motion for New Trial as to Robert F. McDonnell, United States
v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 3:14-CR-12), ECF No. 568, aff’d, 792 F.3d
478 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
77. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2367 (2016); see also 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)
(2012).
78. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)).
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decision or action on a ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or
controversy.’”79
Regarding the first question, the Court noted that the words
“cause,” “suit,” “proceeding,” and “controversy” all indicate a “for-
mal exercise of governmental power, such as a lawsuit, hearing, or
administrative determination.”80  Further, under the statutory inter-
pretation canon of noscitur a sociis, the Court determined that “ques-
tion” and “matter” must be similar in nature to the subsequent four
words, and thus must be “of the same stripe as a lawsuit before a
court.”81  The Court then determined that “arranging a meeting, con-
tacting another official, or hosting an event”—the purported official
actions attributed to McDonnell—were not “questions” or “matters.”
Thus, the Court moved on to the second question: whether McDon-
nell’s activities could be construed as decisions or actions on a ques-
tion or matter, which required the Court to determine if there were
any “questions” or “matters” present in the case.82  The Court first
rejected the government’s assertion that a vague concept such as “eco-
nomic development” could be a question or matter; because a ques-
tion or matter must be capable of being “pending,” it must be “the
kind of thing that can be put on an agenda, tracked for progress, and
then checked off as complete.”83  The Court did accept three ques-
tions or matters as “focused and concrete” enough: (1) whether to
initiate a study of anatabine, (2) whether to allocate grant money for
the study of anatabine, and (3) whether Virginia’s state employee
health plan would cover anatabine as a drug.84
But did McDonnell take an action or make a decision on one of
these questions or matters?  Citing Sun-Diamond, the Court deter-
mined McDonnell had not, as “hosting an event, meeting with other
officials, or speaking with interested parties is not, standing alone, a
‘decision or action’ within the meaning” of the statute.85  Rather,
“something more is required: § 201(a)(3) specifies that the public offi-
cial must make a decision or take an action on that question or matter,
or agree to do so.”86  Here, there was not “something more,” and thus,
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2368–69.
82. Id. at 2369.
83. Id.
84. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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McDonnell had not performed an official act in hosting the event or
setting up the meetings.87
The Court also expressly considered policy concerns in its deci-
sion.88  For example, it noted that the government’s expansive inter-
pretation of the statute would include nearly anything a public official
does as an official act.89  This, the Court reasoned, runs counter to our
tradition of representative government in which public officials appro-
priately hear and address the concerns of their constituents.90  Such an
interpretation, the Court posited, would likely have a chilling effect on
federal officials.91  The Court also noted the federalism concerns in-
herent in allowing the federal government to regulate the “permissible
scope of interactions between state officials and their constituents.”92
In sum, the Court held that setting up a meeting, talking to another
official, or organizing an event, without more, is not an “official act.”93
Although the Court found McDonnell’s actions “distasteful,” or per-
haps “worse than that,” it found that this was not a case about “taw-
dry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball gowns.”94  Rather, it was a case
about the “broader legal implications of the Government’s boundless
interpretation of the federal bribery statute.”95  Contrary to the gov-
ernment’s position, § 201 requires “something more.”
IV. CASES POST MCDONNELL
Some commentators believed that the Supreme Court’s McDonnell
decision would lead to immense challenges for prosecutors attempting
to combat public corruption.96  This Section describes three post-Mc-
Donnell challenges, and outlines the impact that McDonnell had on
these prosecutions—namely, in requiring “something more.”
A. United States v. Halloran
United States v. Halloran was one of the first cases to consider Mc-
Donnell’s holding, as it was already briefed in the Second Circuit by
87. Id. at 2371–72.
88. Id. at 2372.
89. Id.
90. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2373.
93. Id. at 2372.
94. Id. at 2375.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Toobin, supra note 8 (asserting that the Supreme Court would “legalize R
corruption”).
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the time McDonnell came down from the Supreme Court.97  In Hal-
loran, defendant Malcolm A. Smith was a New York State Senator
considering a run for mayor of New York City.98  Smith sought to
avoid a crowded field as a Democrat and instead attempted to run as a
Republican.99  However, for Smith to run as a Republican he needed
to obtain written authorization from three of the five New York City
Republican Party county chairmen, obtaining from each of the three
what is known as a “Wilson-Pakula certificate.”100
The United States alleged Smith attempted to obtain the Wilson-
Pakula certificates by bribing Republican party officials.101  Smith at-
tempted to do so by meeting with Mark Stern, who was purportedly a
politically active member of the community with significant real estate
interests.102  In reality, however, Stern was an FBI informant, who
also had assistance from an undercover FBI agent, Raj.103  Smith al-
legedly instructed the pair to work to secure the certificates from the
Republican Party Chairs, noting that “this was a ‘big thing’ worth ‘go-
ing to the bank’ to achieve, indicating that Raj would ‘own’ Smith if
Raj succeeded in obtaining the Wilson-Pakulas.”104
The government alleged that in exchange for Raj and Stern’s assis-
tance and bribe money (to be paid to the Republican Party officials),
Smith agreed to “to use his position to help obtain New York State
funds to benefit a real estate project supposedly developed by Raj and
Stern.”105  Smith allegedly agreed to help the pair obtain $500,000 in
state transportation funding in order to widen a road near Raj and
97. United States v. Halloran, 664 F. App’x 23 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Minute Entry for ECF
No. BL-100, Halloran, 664 F. App’x 23 (No. 15-2351(L)) (appellant’s brief served on Feb. 2,
2016); Minute Entry for ECF No. BL-118, Halloran, 664 F. App’x 23 (No. 15-2351(L)) (appel-
lee’s brief served on Apr. 21, 2016).
98. Brief for the United States of America at 3, Halloran, 664 F. App’x 23 (No. 15-2351(L)),
ECF No. BL-118.
99. Id. at 3.
100. Indictment at 1, United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 13-CR-
297-KMK), ECF No. 42; see N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-120(1) (McKinney 2016) (“A petition . . . , for
the purpose of designating any person as a candidate for party nomination at a primary election
shall be valid only if the person so designated is an enrolled member of the party referred to.”);
Id. at § 6-120(3) (“The members of the party committee . . . may, by a majority vote . . . ,
authorize the designation or nomination of a person . . . who is not enrolled as a member of such
party as provided in this section.”).
101. Brief for the United States of America, supra note 98, at 4. R
102. Id. at 4.
103. Id. at 4; see Indictment, supra note 100, at 12–13; see also Halloran, 664 F. App’x at 28. R
104. Brief for the United States of America, supra note 98, at 4–5. R
105. Id. at 44.
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Stern’s purported real estate development.106  Accordingly, Smith set
up a meeting between Stern and State Senator Carlucci.107
For their part of the bargain, Raj and Stern—apparently without
Smith’s direct assistance—identified Republican Party officials who
were susceptible to bribery.108  They had various meetings with the
officials at New York City restaurants and discovered that some were
open to the idea of accepting a bribe.109  They also set up a “cover”
job for an official in case there were repercussions for supporting
Smith,110 and took steps to avoid creating a paper trail.111  Cash
changed hands112 and the plan to get the certificates was underway.
Eventually Smith “complained that the party leaders had not yet fol-
lowed through on their promises to get him Wilson-Pakula certifi-
cates,” and issued various vague threats.113
Smith was indicted on several charges, including conspiracy,114 hon-
est services wire fraud and attempted honest services wire fraud,115
violations of the Travel Act,116 and Hobbs Act extortion.117  The jury
106. Id.; see also Indictment, supra note 100, at 19. R
107. Brief for the United States of America, supra note 98, at 47–48; see also Brief for Defen- R
dant-Appellant Malcolm Smith at 75–76, United States v. Halloran, 664 F. App’x 23 (2d Cir.
2016) (Nos. 15-2351(L)), ECF No. BL-100.
108. Brief for the United States of America, supra note 98, at 5 (noting that the team “worked R
to secure enough Wilson-Pakulas to enable Smith to seek the Republican nomination” and that
they “quickly identified” Vince Tabone, as it was “all about the bottom line for him . . . . [Y]ou
can buy him off tomorrow” (alterations in original)).
109. Id. at 6 (“Tabone suggested that Savino was ‘very approachable,’ Raj and Stern could
‘talk business’ with him, and that Savino would expect ‘parity’ with whatever the other county
chairmen received.”); Id. (“Halloran . . . told them that, in exchange for a Wilson-Pakula,
Tabone wanted $150,000, with $50,000 as an ‘above board’ donation to his party, and $100,000 as
a personal payment in ‘the other direction.’”).
110. Id. at 6.
111. Id. at 7 (“Smith and Raj also discussed creating a cover story for the payments as retain-
ers to the bribe recipients, while simultaneously avoiding a paper trail that could show the pay-
ments were actually to acquire Wilson-Pakula certificates.”).
112. Id. at 7–8 (“Raj handed Tabone two envelopes containing a total of $25,000 in cash. Like
Tabone, Savino also . . . accepted $15,000 in cash with another $15,000 to be paid after he for-
mally approved Smith’s appearance on the 2013 Republican ballot line.” (citations omitted)).
113. Id. at 8 (“[W]hen you screw somebody over money like that . . . , you know, that’s the
worst . . . you’re looking over your shoulder all the rest of your life . . . . You’re looking over your
shoulder . . . , because, not only that, this world is too small.” (second, third, and fourth altera-
tions in original)).
114. Indictment, supra note 100, at 21; see also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). R
115. Indictment, supra note 100, at 21; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, 1349, 2 (2012). R
116. Indictment, supra note 100, at 24; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012). R
117. Indictment, supra note 100, at 24; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012). R
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found Smith guilty on all counts118 and Smith appealed to the Second
Circuit.119
The issue on appeal, as framed by Smith, squarely confronted the
question at issue in McDonnell.120  Smith characterized the issue as
“whether Smith agreed to take official action when he agreed to ask
Carlucci to meet with Stern.”121  In Smith’s view, this question was
dispositive, as “the critical inquiry [was] not whether a public official
agreed to assist a person seeking to confer a benefit upon him, but
whether the official promised to take official action on the person’s
behalf.”122  Smith argued that he never “advise[d] Carlucci to allocate
$500,000 in discretionary funds to widen Rte. 45 in connection with
Stern’s real estate project.”123
The government took significant issue with Smith’s argument.  First,
the government argued that Second Circuit precedent “ma[de] clear
that an official who uses his position to arrange for benefactors to
meet other officials about public business is engaged in official ac-
tion.”124  The government therefore broadly read “official action,”
and criticized Smith for not doing the same:
Smith ignores these cases [that define “official action” as including
arranging a meeting], instead hoping that the Supreme Court will
change the law in his favor when deciding McDonnell v. United
States. . . .  But even if the Supreme Court does so, that would not
ultimately aid Smith, because Smith’s conviction does not turn on
whether arranging a meeting constitutes official action.125
118. See Minute Entry of Feb. 5, 2015, United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (No. 13-CR-297-KMK) (“Jury Verdict as to Malcolm A. Smith (1) Guilty on Count 1s, 2s,
3s, 4s.”).
119. See generally United States v. Halloran, 664 F. App’x 23 (2d Cir. 2016).
120. Brief for Defendant-Appellant Malcolm Smith, supra note 107, at 75 (“At issue is R
whether Smith agreed to take official action when he agreed to ask Carlucci to meet with
Stern.”); see also Brief for the United States of America, supra note 98, at 47 (“Smith, however, R
characterizes his actions as arranging a meeting between State Senator Carlucci and Stern, then
argues that this does not qualify as an ‘official act.’”).  Note, however, that the case was briefed
before McDonnell was decided. Compare Minute Entry for ECF No. BL-100, Halloran, 664 F.
App’x 23 (No. 15-2351(L)) (appellant’s brief served on Feb. 2, 2016), with McDonnell v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2016) (case decided on June 27, 2016).  The parties did seem to be
aware of McDonnell and its potential impact on the case. See Brief for the United States of
America, supra note 98, at 48 n.12 (“Smith . . . instead hop[es] that the Supreme Court will R
change the law in his favor when deciding McDonnell v. United States.”).
121. Brief for Defendant-Appellant Malcolm Smith, supra note 107, at 75. R
122. Id. at 75–76 (emphasis omitted).
123. Id.
124. Brief for the United States of America, supra note 98, at 47. R
125. Id. at 48 n.12 (internal citation omitted).
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Thus, the government also contested Smith’s characterization that his
actions were merely arranging a meeting.126  Instead, the government
argued the “indictment did not charge Smith with arranging meetings
in return for the Wilson-Pakula bribes; it charged that he agreed to
help allocate state funds in return for these bribes.”127  Accordingly,
as the government had other evidence of Smith’s agreement to obtain
the $500,000 of funding for Raj and Stern,128 the question of whether
or not a meeting constituted “official action” did not matter in up-
holding Smith’s conviction.129
It is clear that the government’s first argument does not comport
with McDonnell. The government argued that any time a public offi-
cial “uses his position to arrange for benefactors to meet other offi-
cials about public business,” he is necessarily “engaged in official
action.”130  However, after McDonnell, this surely cannot be the case,
as the Court held that setting up a meeting, talking to another official,
or organizing an event, without more, is not an official act.131
The government’s second argument, however, remains valid after
McDonnell: there was sufficient evidence to convict Smith regardless
of whether or not the meeting constituted an official action.132  The
McDonnell Court noted that setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or
making a phone call is not always innocent or irrelevant.133 Rather,
setting up a meeting could “serve as evidence of an agreement to take
an official act,” such as “attempting to pressure or advise another offi-
cial on a pending matter.”134  If there was voluminous additional evi-
126. Cf. Brief for Defendant-Appellant Malcolm Smith, supra note 107, at 75 (“At issue is R
whether Smith agreed to take official action when he agreed to ask Carlucci to meet with
Stern.”); Id. at 78 (“Simply put, Smith did not seek to ‘influence’ Carlucci in any decision or
action to award state transportation funds.”).
127. Brief for the United States of America, supra note 98, at 48. R
128. Id. at 49–50 (noting that other evidence included that “Smith had sent a letter to the
Mayor of Spring Valley, in which Smith lied to help obtain city approval for the [real estate]
project,” that “Smith told Raj and Stern that he (Smith) had found a source from which the
desired funds could be allocated,” that “Smith did not describe the meeting [with Carlucci] as an
end goal, but rather as a step toward accomplishing the planned official action,” that Smith
agreed to “‘work with’ Carlucci to ‘show him where in the budget, how to get it and all that
stuff,’” and that Smith told Raj and Stern that getting the money did not necessarily have to be
through Carlucci, and was obtainable through other means, such as going directly “‘to the
agency’ that would implement the project’”).
129. Id. at 48–50.
130. Id. at 47.
131. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
132. Brief for the United States of America, supra note 98, at 48–50. R
133. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371.
134. Id.
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dence as the government asserted, Smith’s conviction would survive a
McDonnell challenge.135
The Second Circuit, applying McDonnell, agreed with the govern-
ment’s second argument.136  Noting that “merely setting up a meet-
ing—without more—does not qualify as an official act,” the court
acknowledged that such action can “serve as evidence of an agree-
ment to take an official act.”137  As such, because there was sufficient
evidence of Smith’s agreement to help allocate state funds for Raj’s
and Stern’s benefit in exchange for the bribe payments, even aside
from the meeting, the court rejected Smith’s argument.  The Second
Circuit affirmed because the “jury could properly conclude that this
evidenced an agreement to take official action in exchange for pay-
ment of Wilson-Pakula bribes.”138
Thus, the Second Circuit rejected the government’s first argument
that Smith took official action by setting up the meeting between Car-
lucci, Stern, and Raj.  Rather, the court agreed with the government’s
second argument and necessarily rejected Smith’s argument that the
meeting was the only possible official action taken by Smith.  Al-
though Smith arranging the meeting, by itself, was not enough to con-
stitute official action, it served as one piece in a mosaic of evidence of
Smith’s agreement to take official action in exchange for the Wilson-
Pakula bribes.139  The government had shown “something more,” and
thus the prosecution survived McDonnell.
B. United States v. Greenhut
In United States v. Greenhut, defendant Ivan Greenhut was the
owner of two California companies; each sold office supplies, furni-
ture, and electronic equipment.140  After obtaining a GSA contract,
Greenhut began selling this equipment to the United States govern-
ment.141  Eventually, in an apparent effort to increase sales, Greenhut
agreed to give his customers, including United States contracting of-
ficers, gifts based on the amount of supplies they purchased from his
company.142  He created a rewards program for purchasers in which
135. See supra note 128. R
136. United States v. Halloran, 664 F. App’x 23, 28 (2d Cir. 2016).
137. Id. (quoting McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371–72).
138. Id.
139. Id.; see also Brief for the United States of America, supra note 98, at 48–50; Brief for R
Defendant-Appellant Malcolm Smith, supra note 107, at 75–78. R
140. See generally Indictment at 1–3, United States v. Greenhut, No. 2:15-CR-477-CAS, 2016
WL 6652681 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2016), ECF No. 1.
141. Id. at 3.
142. Id.
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they could accumulate points after purchases and redeem them for
gifts.143  These gifts “included gift cards, Apple iPods, Apple iPads,
computers, video game consoles, grocery gift cards, DVD players, cel-
lular phones, plasma televisions, and cash.”144  In total, the value of
gifts conferred upon the government officials reached $42,590 and the
amount the government purchased from Greenhut’s company reached
approximately $3 million.145  The government purchased these items
in a streamlined manner, as Greenhut’s company “had a contract with
the United States General Services Administration . . . , which deline-
ated pre-negotiated pricing terms and conditions.”146
The government charged Greenhut with conspiracy,147 witness tam-
pering,148 and payment of gratuities.149  The specific gratuities offense
alleged was giving “a one-hundred dollar Safeway gift certificate, to a
public official . . . acting for and on behalf of the United States Army,
for and because of an official act . . . , namely, ordering office sup-
plies” from Greenhut’s company.150  Greenhut was tried by jury in
2015 and found guilty on the conspiracy and gratuities charges.151
After the Supreme Court decided McDonnell in June 2016, Green-
hut moved for a judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, for a new
trial.152  The thrust of Greenhut’s argument was that “the
‘micropurchase’ of office supplies does not constitute an ‘official act’
as construed by McDonnell.”153  Invoking Sun-Diamond,154 McDon-
nell,155 and Valdes,156 Greenhut argued that courts have read “official
143. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal as to Counts I and
III; Exhibits at 8, United States v. Greenhut, 2016 WL 6652681 (No. 2:15-CR-477-CAS), ECF
No. 164.
144. Indictment, supra note 140, at 3. R
145. Id. at 3–5; see also Greenhut, 2016 WL 6652681, at *1.
146. Greenhut, 2016 WL 6652681, at *1.
147. Indictment, supra note 140, at 1; see also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). R
148. Indictment, supra note 140, at 7; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (2012). R
149. Indictment, supra note 140, at 8; see also 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (2012). R
150. Indictment, supra note 140, at 8. R
151. See Minute Entry for ECF No. 130, Greenhut, 2016 WL 6652681 (No. 2:15-CR-477-CAS).
152. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal as to Counts I and
III; Exhibits, supra note 143; Notice of Motion; Motion for a New Trial; Memorandum of Points R
and Authorities; Exhibits, Greenhut, 2016 WL 6652681 (No. 2:15-CR-477-CAS), ECF No. 166;
see also McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372 (2016).
153. Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal as to Counts I and III;
Exhibits, supra note 143, at 4. R
154. Id. at 4 (“The term ‘official act’ is a ‘precisely targeted prohibition’ which the Court has
determined must ‘linguistically be interpreted[ ] to be . . . a scalpel,’ not a ‘meat axe.’” (second
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S.
398, 412 (1999))).
155. Id. (citing McDonnell and stating that the McDonnell court was “endorsing [Sun-Dia-
mond’s] proposition to adopt a ‘constrained interpretation’ of ‘official act’ and declining to rely
on government ‘discretion’ to protect against ‘overzealous prosecutions’ under the statute”).
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act” quite narrowly in an effort to avoid vagueness and due process
challenges.157
Greenhut’s argument focused on McDonnell’s first requirement for
an “official act”: “the Government must identify a ‘question, matter,
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’ that ‘may at any time be pend-
ing’ or ‘may by law be brought’ before a public official.”158  The Mc-
Donnell Court described this as requiring something akin to a “formal
exercise of governmental power, such as a lawsuit, hearing, or admin-
istrative determination.”159  Greenhut sought to separate the
“micropurchases” of office supplies by low-level government employ-
ees from the government’s award of the GSA contract to his
company.160
In essence, Greenhut argued that the “question” or “matter” before
the government official was related to the award of the GSA contract
instead of the individual “micropurchases” of office supplies.161
Greenhut noted that the micropurchases were done “without con-
tracts, pursuant to a streamlined process which limits and oversees the
controlled decisions of low-level government functionaries,” and that
the micropurchase program is designed to “dispense with the formality
and discretion of the contracting process.”162  Further, he asserted that
the government supply technicians had a lack of autonomy and in-
stead were rigidly confined to “a protocol to procure the specified
item in the most ‘efficient’ and ‘cost-effective’ manner,” including an
inventory search and use of only GSA approved vendors in most cir-
cumstances.163  He also argued that all technicians were still “required
to demonstrate to [their] supervisor that Mr. Greenhut’s company in
fact gave [them] the best prices,” and that the technicians purchased
through Greenhut’s company because it gave them the best price,
good service, and fast shipping.164
156. Id. at 5 (“Like the ‘rule of lenity,’ the Court’s ‘interpretive gloss’ in Sun-Diamond and
now McDonnell works to protect a citizen from punishment ‘under a statute that gives at best
dubious notice that it has criminalized his conduct.’” (citing Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d
1319, 1323 (2007))).
157. Id. at 4–5.
158. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368; see also Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Judg-
ment of Acquittal as to Counts I and III; Exhibits, supra note 143, at 5. R
159. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368–69.
160. Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal as to Counts I and III;
Exhibits, supra note 143, at 7. R
161. Id. (“While the latter—the award of a government contract—may be the type of ‘ques-
tion’ or ‘matter’ that falls within McDonnell’s definition of ‘official act,’ the ‘micropurchase’ of
‘simple’ office supplies on the facts here is not.”).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 7–8.
164. Id. at 8.
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Thus, in Greenhut’s view, a micropurchase was necessarily not an
official act for McDonnell purposes, as it is “the opposite of govern-
ment formality” and, while it is technically a “decision,” it is not a
“decision” on a “question or matter,” as required by the statute.165
The government took the opposite view of “official action,” arguing
that “the expenditure of government funds in accordance with federal
acquisition regulations is . . . a formal exercise of government
power.”166  The government noted that “government purchase card-
holders were acting within their delegated authority when making
‘micropurchases,’ including the purchase of office supplies,” and that,
as a part of this authority, the “cardholders decide how and, impor-
tantly, where to spend government funds.”167
Turning Greenhut’s argument on its head, the government further
argued that the government officers’ obligation to follow a strict pro-
tocol “underscore[s] the formality in the exercise of government au-
thority inherent in the expenditure of government funds.”168  In
essence, the government argued that the purchasing agents were still
performing official acts through the micropurchases and Greenhut’s
argument that micropurchases were “not important enough to consti-
tute official acts” was erroneous because the purchasing agents an-
swered the question of “where” to purchase the office supplies.169
The district court agreed with the government and denied Green-
hut’s motions.170 The court noted that “[n]othing in the Anti-Gratuity
Statute or the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell limits the
meaning of ‘formal exercise of government power’ to the magnitude
of the official’s decision or the contract.”171  Rather, because deciding
who does business with the government is a formal exercise of power
and the government purchase agents retained the power to decide
how and where to purchase supplies, the government’s interpretation
of “official action” prevailed.172  The court held that a decision on the
purchase of office supplies could be “something more:” a jury could
find that it “constitutes a ‘question’ or ‘matter’ that is ‘pending’ before
165. Id. at 9.
166. See Government’s Omnibus Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for a Judgement of Ac-
quittal and Motion for a New Trial; Declaration of Christopher C. Kendall; Exhibits at 5–6,
United States v. Greenhut, No. 2:15-CR-477-CAS, 2016 WL 6652681 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2016),
ECF No. 171.
167. Id. at 7.
168. Id. at 8.
169. Id. at 6–8.
170. Greenhut, 2016 WL 6652681, at *5–6.
171. Id. at *5.
172. Id.
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a public official and that a public official made a decision or took an
action ‘on’ that question or matter,” satisfying McDonnell’s require-
ments for official action.173
C. United States v. Silver
In United States v. Silver, Sheldon Silver, the former Speaker of the
New York State Assembly, faced prosecution for allegedly performing
official acts in exchange for kickbacks in the form of a physician’s re-
ferral fees directed toward his private law practice.174  Silver took
three purportedly official acts175 in exchange for these referral fees: he
secured an Assembly resolution honoring the physician, agreed to as-
sist the physician with acquiring permits for a charity race, and helped
the physician “secure a job with a non-profit receiving state
funding.”176
The government charged Silver with honest services fraud, extor-
tion, and money laundering.177  At trial, the parties disagreed on the
proper “official act” jury instruction.  Silver’s proposed instruction fo-
cused on the “exercise of actual governmental power,” while the gov-
ernment’s instruction sought to include “any action taken or to be
taken under color of official authority.”178  The district court ulti-
mately adopted the government’s broad instruction179 and the jury
found Silver guilty on four counts of honest services fraud, two counts
of extortion, and a count of monetary transactions involving crime
proceeds.180  The district court sentenced Silver to twelve years of im-
prisonment, a $1.75 million fine, and $5.4 million in forfeiture.181
Silver appealed, and within two months of his district court verdict,
the Supreme Court decided McDonnell.182  Silver argued that the dis-
trict court’s jury instruction—that “any action taken or to be taken
under color of official authority” constituted an official act—was over-
broad under McDonnell.183  Applying the definition of official act
173. Id.; see generally McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
174. 864 F.3d 102, 105–06 (2d Cir. 2017).
175. The government’s theory of the case included additional acts, but they fell outside of the
statute of limitations. Id. at 119–20.
176. Id.
177. See Criminal Complaint, United States v. Silver, 184 F. Supp. 3d 33 (S.D.N.Y 2016) (No.
1:15-CR-93), ECF No. 1, rev’d, 864 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2017).
178. Silver, 864 F.3d at 111.
179. Id.
180. See Verdict Sheet, United States v. Silver, 184 F. Supp. 3d 33 (No. 1:15-CR-93), ECF No.
137.
181. Silver, 864 F.3d at 112–13.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 118.
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given in McDonnell, the Second Circuit found that the district court’s
instruction was indeed too broad, and the jury thus “could not have
received a correct interpretation of the law.”184
Beyond finding error in the jury instructions, the Second Circuit
also declined to hold that this error was harmless.185  Because only
one of three actions on which the government made a showing
“clearly remain[ed] an ‘official act’ under McDonnell,” the jury “may
have convicted Silver by relying on acts . . . that are no longer ‘official’
under McDonnell.”186  For example, Silver’s offer to help the physi-
cian “navigate the process” of obtaining a permit for a charity race
may not have satisfied the requirements for an official act under Mc-
Donnell, as it may have been a mere offer of general assistance
without any exertion of pressure on governmental officials.187  Addi-
tionally, Silver’s assistance of the physician in obtaining a job did not
become an official act merely because it was done using official gov-
ernment letterhead.188
Silver’s only remaining act, the resolution and proclamation honor-
ing the physician, did involve the formal exercise of governmental
power and thus was an official act under McDonnell.189  However, the
Second Circuit found, “it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a
rational jury would have found Silver guilty based on the resolution
alone.”190  Emphasizing the pro forma nature of the state’s honorary
resolutions, the court held that a rational jury could have found these
actions to be de minimis.191  Thus, the court found that the error could
not have been harmless.192
Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated Silver’s conviction under
McDonnell.193  Although the same court in Halloran rejected a Mc-
Donnell challenge,194 the two opinions can be read in harmony.  While
the material challenged under McDonnell in Halloran merely served
to bolster the government’s case, leaving ample evidence sufficient to
convict, the McDonnell challenge in Silver left only a bare official ac-
tion—an honorary state senate resolution—that a jury could have
184. Id.
185. Id. at 119.
186. Silver, 864 F.3d at 119.
187. Id. at 120.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 121.
190. Id.
191. Silver, 864 F.3d at 121.
192. Id. at 119–21.
193. Id. at 124.
194. See supra notes 97–139 and accompanying text.
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found de minimis.  The court was unwilling to affirm a conviction
based solely on such a showing—the government had not shown the
“something more” that McDonnell required.
V. MCDONNELL’S IMPACT
The preceding three examples show typical McDonnell chal-
lenges.195  As illustrated, even McDonnell challenges to pre-McDon-
nell jury instructions are not sure to be successful—if the government
can point to the “something more” to which the Supreme Court al-
luded, reviewing courts are less inclined to overturn a conviction.  This
Section will review the likely impact that McDonnell will have on fu-
ture public corruption prosecutions.
One crucial step in determining this impact is identifying what con-
stitutes an official act after McDonnell. McDonnell explicitly gave
three such scenarios:
[1.] [A] decision or action to initiate a research study—or a deci-
sion or action on a qualifying step, such as narrowing down the list
of potential research topics—would qualify as an “official act.”
[2.] A public official may also make a decision or take an action
on a “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” by
using his official position to exert pressure on another official to per-
form an “official act.” . . .
[3.] [I]f a public official uses his official position to provide advice
to another official, knowing or intending that such advice will form
the basis for an “official act” by another official, that too can qualify
as a decision or action for purposes of § 201(a)(3).196
Could Governor McDonnell have been re-prosecuted under one of
these surviving definitions of “official act”?  Although officials within
the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia reportedly recommended a new trial for Governor McDonnell
195. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 207 F. Supp. 3d 576 (E.D.N.C. 2016) (official act ques-
tion included “whether to use official law enforcement authority to cause Verizon to produce
text messages belonging to Defendant’s wife,” and “whether to use official law enforcement
authority and discretion to disclose Defendant’s wife’s text messages to Defendant in his capac-
ity as a private citizen”); United States v. Pomrenke, 198 F. Supp. 3d 648, 701 (W.D. Va. 2016)
(agreement “to purchase products and services” from a company constitutes a “formal exercise
of governmental power” and thus qualifies as an official act); United States v. Bills, No. 14-CR-
135-1, 2016 WL 4528075, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2019) (influencing government committee
members how to vote, and “exemplify[ing]” company’s strengths, inter alia, constituted official
action).
196. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370; see also Federal Corruption Statutes—Bribery—Definition
of “Official Act”—McDonnell v. United States, 130 HARV. L. REV. 467, 475–76 (2016) (quoting
same).
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after the Supreme Court’s decision, the Department of Justice ulti-
mately declined to retry him.197
It seems unlikely that McDonnell, on the facts known, could have
been successfully retried under one of these alternative definitions.
The Supreme Court characterized McDonnell’s purportedly official
actions as essentially arranging meetings and hosting and attending
parties.198  After that unanimous opinion from the Supreme Court,
the government would have to rethink its entire strategy and develop
an almost completely different record from which to cull new official
acts.
However, if we imagine a prosecution of a new defendant beginning
wholly after the decision in McDonnell, we can paint a different pic-
ture—even with facts similar to McDonnell’s.  Prosecuting attorneys
will have the new definition of “official act” in their minds from the
beginning of the case and will be looking for “something more” from
the outset.  They can tailor their theory of the case to fit within one of
the above surviving definitions.  Prosecutors can attempt to reframe
cases such as Governor McDonnell’s—which was based on “theories
of access and influence”—instead now prosecuting them as “cases in
which officials used their offices to pressure subordinates, offer ad-
vice, or take initial steps somewhat attenuated from the ultimate offi-
cial action.”199  Such a case would likely survive a McDonnell
challenge, as framing the case in this way would ensure the theory of
the case fits into a surviving definition.
Moreover, cases like Halloran and Greenhut give us a certain de-
gree of insight into how lower courts will handle McDonnell chal-
lenges.  The Halloran court viewed a meeting as one part of a larger
array of evidence showing official action.200  The court also, however,
seemed to accept that the meeting itself could be used as evidence
tending to show a decision or action on a pending question or mat-
197. See Matt Zapotosky, U.S. Attorney’s Office Recommends Putting Robert McDonnell on
Trial Again, WASH. POST (Sep. 2, 2016), http://wpo.st/hieI2 (“[T]he U.S. attorney’s office [for the
Eastern District of Virginia] has recommended to Justice Department higher-ups that they en-
deavor to try him again . . . .”); see also Unopposed Motion to Remand for Dismissal, United
States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-4019),
ECF No. BL-156 (declining to prosecute McDonnell again); Ariane deVogue, No New Trial for
Ex-Virginia Gov. Bob McDonnell, CNN (Sep. 8, 2016), http://cnn.it/2cwSckV (reporting same);
see generally Federal Corruption Statutes—Bribery—Definition of “Official Act”—McDonnell v.
United States, supra note 196, at 476 (same). R
198. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365–66.
199. Federal Corruption Statutes—Bribery—Definition of “Official Act”—McDonnell v.
United States, supra note 196, at 476. R
200. United States v. Halloran, 664 F. App’x 23, 28 (2d Cir. 2016).
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ter—it just could not be the only evidence of the decision or action.201
Thus, the Halloran court took literally the Supreme Court’s statement
in McDonnell that “setting up a meeting, talking to another official, or
organizing an event (or agreeing to do so)—without more—does not
fit that definition of ‘official act.’”202  However, if the government can
point to “something more,” a McDonnell challenge will be less likely
to succeed.203  Considering the government can even use a defen-
dant’s arranging of a meeting as evidence of that “something
more,”204 it seems likely that as time goes by, prosecutors will frame
their cases in a way that insulates them from McDonnell.205
The Greenhut decision further shows that lower courts may read
McDonnell narrowly.  Although the defense attorneys crafted a crea-
tive argument—contrasting the formality language of McDonnell with
the purportedly informal nature of the federal government’s card
purchasing structure—the court was not persuaded.206  The court also
appears to have held that a government actor’s decision on even the
smallest minutiae could be a decision or action on a pending question
or matter because “[d]eciding who does business with the government
constitutes a formal exercise of power.”207
In short, the Supreme Court in McDonnell had the opportunity to
circumscribe one aspect of the federal criminal scheme.  Indeed, many
commentators believed that this is exactly what the Supreme Court
did, predicting that the decision “will erode the ability of prosecutors
across the United States to make corruption cases stick in court.”208
One commentator even stated that “the Court set a new standard for
official-bribery cases that is so absurdly narrow that it will likely be
201. See id. (discussing the meeting in the context of the other, non-meeting, evidence).
202. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
203. Halloran, 664 F. App’x at 28.
204. See, e.g., McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371 (meeting perhaps “could serve as evidence of an
agreement to take an official act”).
205. McDonnell challenges are even more likely to fail under plain error review. See, e.g.,
United States v. Boyland, 862 F.3d 279, 289–91 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding that although jury instruc-
tions given in the case violated McDonnell, they did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights
and therefore did not warrant reversal); United States v. Porter, No. 7:15-22-DCR, 2017 WL
1095040, at *2–3 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 22, 2017) (“[Defendant’s] actions . . . fall within the McDon-
nell’s definition, and any error that may exists for failing to provide that definition to the jury
would not constitute plain error.”).
206. United States v. Greenhut, No. 2:15-CR-477-CAS, 2016 WL 6652681, at *5 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2016).
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., Alex Howard et al., Supreme Court Decision on McDonnell Opens Worrying
New Horizons for Corruption, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION, Jun. 28, 2016, https://sunlightfoundation
.com/2016/06/28/supreme-court-decision-on-mcdonnell-opens-worrying-new-horizons-for-corrup
tion/.
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almost impossible to convict any but the most bumbling politicians of
this crime.”209  However, we have already seen that this is not the
case: McDonnell has not been some kind of “magic bullet” for defend-
ants charged with bribery-type offenses.  Instead, lower courts are ap-
plying the decision cautiously, and are looking for the “something
more” beyond a simple meeting that rises to the level of an “official
act.”
So what is McDonnell’s impact?  Prosecutors will surely tailor their
theory of a defendant’s “official act” to fit within one of the three
surviving definitions left open by the McDonnell Court.210  From the
onset of an investigation, prosecutors and investigators will be looking
for “something more”—simply finding that a public official set up a
meeting in exchange for a bribe will no longer suffice.  Aside from
this, McDonnell will affect pattern jury instructions—which will, in
turn, further reinforce to prosecutors that their theories of the case
must fit into one of the surviving definitions of “official act.”211
VI. CONCLUSION
McDonnell is best understood as a decision that will force prosecu-
tors to be more conscientious in shaping their cases.  It does not seem
to follow, however, that there will be fewer “official act” prosecu-
tions—prosecutors still have several “official act” theories to choose
from. McDonnell does not—despite fears to the contrary—eliminate
the prosecution of bribery of government officials.  Rather, it merely
forces prosecutors to look for the “something more”—something (an-
ything) beyond a simple meeting—when defining a government ac-
tor’s official act in a bribery prosecution.
209. Davidson, supra note 2.  And, it seems as though this is, at least partially, what the Court R
itself thought it was doing. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2016) (“[Our
concern is] with the broader legal implications of the Government’s boundless interpretation of
the federal bribery statute.”).
210. See supra notes 196–199 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., United States v. Williams, R
No. 17-137, 2017 WL 2713404 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2017) (reviewing and declining to dismiss a
post-McDonnell superseding indictment under McDonnell’s test).
211. Federal Corruption Statutes—Bribery—Definition of “Official Act”—McDonnell v.
United States, supra note 196, at 476 (“McDonnell may be best understood as revising jury
instructions rather than rewriting what constitutes corruption itself.”).  However, as shown, im-
proper jury instructions are not always fatal to a prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Green-
hut, No. 2:15-CR-477-CAS, 2016 WL 6652681, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2016) (“Accordingly, the
Court concludes that the instructions provided to the jury satisfied the requirements of McDon-
nell and did not mislead or confuse, inadequately guide the jury’s deliberations, or improperly
intrude on the fact-finding process.  Thus, the Court’s instructions were not erroneous.”)
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